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The employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in combat operations has
demonstrated that UAVs can effectively provide surveillance, reconnaissance, and target
acquisition support in place of manned aircraft. However, the Pioneer UAV, currently
employed by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, has an unacceptable mishap rate. Half of
the UAV mishaps are attributable in part to human factors causes. This points to a
requirement for developing tailored intervention strategies. This study develops a
stochastic simulation model of UAV mishaps to be used for the evaluation of human
factor initiatives in terms of budgetary cost and mission readiness. It determines that
electro-mechanically caused mishaps cost approximately the same as human factors
mishaps. However, in comparison, human factors mishaps degrade mission readiness
significantly. Intervention strategies need to address unsafe acts by the operator, unsafe
conditions for flight operations, and unsafe supervision. The study recommends the
following intervention measures: the use of system simulators; the implementation of
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by the Israeli Defense
Forces during the Peace for Galilee campaign in 1982, and by United States forces during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91, provides a proof of concept that
relatively low cost UAVs can provide effective surveillance, reconnaissance, target
acquisition and fire support adjustment missions. The United States has employed UAVs
subsequently in operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and most recently in Kosovo. The
Department of the Navy's doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea will place
greater reliance on aerial battlefield surveillance from "over the horizon" or expeditionary
sites ashore in order to control a greater operational area with less force concentration.
However, the current Naval UAV platform, the Pioneer, is beset by an unacceptable
mishap rate. Since its fielding in operational units in 1986, the Pioneer Class A flight
mishap rate is 385 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. This stands in stark contrast to that
of manned Naval Aviation where the rate is approximately two Class A flight mishaps
per 100,000 flight hours.
Schmidt & Parker (1995), while working at the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk,
Virginia, have identified that human factors related issues cause half of the Naval UAV
mishaps. Seagle (1997) applies the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) taxonomy to UAV mishap reports in order to improve human factors mishap
investigation, reporting and analysis. The HFACS taxonomy, based upon the Reason
(1990) "Swiss Cheese" model of accident causation, captures the latent conditions that
"set the stage" for active failures that lead to mishaps.
This study refines the coding of UAV mishaps in accordance with the HFACS
taxonomy. Once the mishaps are parsed, the factors influencing the mishap rate and their
resultant costs are computed. These results are used to conduct a stochastic model
simulation of annual UAV flight operations in order to isolate those categories of mishaps
that contribute most to increased budgetary costs and decreased mission readiness. The
study places UAV mishap reports from FY86 to FY98 into categories using the HFACS
taxonomy. Particular emphasis is placed on the FY93 to FY98 period when Naval UAVs
first came under the cognizance of the Naval Aviation Safety Program. Then, mishap
rates and probabilities are estimated for the various categories. Thereupon, these
probability distributions are used as the input to a stochastic model for the simulation of
annual flight operations. The model output is the annual mishap costs associated with a
particular category, and a resulting mission readiness index.
Intervention strategies are assigned to associated category of mishap causation.
Comparing the annual mishap cost, readiness index, and the feasibility associated with a
particular intervention strategy, Fleet users and program managers can determine what
intervention strategies are most appropriate. Some strategies are specific to the Pioneer
system, for example, an engine remanufacturing or upgrading, or an electronic
weatherproofing modification. Other strategies, such as improved aircrew coordination
training and personnel assignment stabilization, transcend the Pioneer system, and are
applicable to all follow-on UAV configurations.
The mishap categorization phase of this study, data coding and classification, was
conducted independently of previous studies (Schmidt & Parker, 1995; Seagle, 1997).
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The relative frequency of mishap causes agrees with the previous classifications, and
validates their findings. Even though mishap reports remain vague, and lack granularity
at identifying lower, root causes, there is general agreement in the classification of the
mishap in each independent analysis.
The second phase of the study, stochastic model simulation of annual flight
operations, finds that electro-mechanical causes have a low impact on mission readiness
although they account for approximately one-quarter of UAV mishaps. On the other
hand, unsafe acts, unsafe conditions for flight operations, and unsafe supervision have a
more significant impact on equipment repair and replacement costs, and mission
readiness. The study concludes that addressing the human factors related issues through
increased aircrew coordination training, the use of simulators for mission rehearsal,
personnel stabilization, and the development of a UAV career path, will have a greater
impact on controlling cost and improving readiness. The study also generates the
budgetary costs of selected mishap categories. These costs can be compared to the cost of
implementing a particular intervention strategy. Thereupon, the program manager can
chose the most appropriate strategies for implementation. While in isolation, no single
intervention strategy will eliminate mishap occurrences; their implementation will




From the advent of modern military operations through the present day, successful
commanders have relied on knowledge of the battlefield and intelligence of the enemy's
disposition in order to employ their force to achieve victory (Marine Aviation Weapons
and Tactics Squadron One [MAWTS-1], 1997). During the 19th century, in the American
Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, hot air balloons were employed in order to get a
bird's eye view of the battlefield. They added a third dimension to the intelligence
collecting effort. Early in the 20th century, the invention of the airplane replaced the
restrictive and vulnerable use of balloons. During the First World War, manned aircraft
were employed as airborne intelligence collectors. Later, in the 1960's in response to
increasingly lethal air defense networks and enormously developing technology,
reconnaissance satellites have taken over the role of aerial surveillance at the strategic and
operational levels of warfare. Presently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are used to
augment satellite systems by providing near real-time, tactical aerial reconnaissance.
However, the current Naval UAV, the Pioneer, is beset by an unacceptable mishap rate.
This thesis addresses several potential intervention strategies designed to mitigate these
mishaps, lower their budgetary cost and improve operational readiness.
B. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
The U-2 "spy plane" was developed during the early 1950s in order to monitor
Soviet ICBM development and deployment (Jones, 1997). The U.S. conducted U-2 over
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flights of the Soviet Union since 1955. On 2 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot
down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union by an SA-2 "Guideline" missile. The shoot down of
Powers, and the failed attempt at covering up the mission, proved to be a devastating
blow to the U.S.'s international prestige. A second U-2 was shot down over Cuba during
the Missile Crisis on 27 October 1962, while attempting to determine the status of Soviet
nuclear missiles. Consequently, the nation became increasingly wary of manned
reconnaissance. However, the only reconnaissance systems in development were the SR-
71 Blackbird and the CORONA spy-satellite. Both of these systems were designed for
strategic level reconnaissance only.
The U.S. made an initial serious attempt at an airborne tactical reconnaissance
UAV during the Vietnam War (Jones, 1997). The U.S. Air Force experimented with
launching the Teledyne-Ryan developed Lightning Bug UAV from MC-130's in order to
conduct aerial reconnaissance. By the end of the war, the Lightning Bug UAV had grown
into a vehicle for providing real-time video, electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection,
electronic countermeasures (ECM), communications intelligence (COMLNT) and
psychological operations (PSYOPS) leaflet dropping. However interest in UAVs waned
as the war wound down, and the Department of Defense (DoD) trimmed budgets and
force structure.
Nevertheless, U.S. lessons learned in Vietnam did not go unheeded. During that
same period, Israel Aircraft Industries (LAI) began the successful development UAVs for
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) (Kumar, 1997). These Israeli developed and
manufactured UAVs were first employed in combat in 1982 during the Peace for Galilee
campaign in Lebanon. During an attack against Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley, the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched decoy missiles to stimulate the Syrian air defense
system. As the Syrians responded to this perceived attack, Israeli Mastiff and Scout
UAVs with electro-optical and radar-detecting payloads were able to locate and target
Syrian missile sites. Once target locations were confirmed, and during the Syrian missile
reload cycle, the IAF launched A-4, F-4 and KFIR aircraft to attack these targets. The
Israelis destroyed 19 SAM batteries and 86 MiG aircraft while only losing one aircraft of
their own, effectively dismembering the entire Syrian air defense network.
The early 1980s saw a resurgence in enthusiasm for UAVs within DoD as a result
of the Israeli's successful UAV employment in Lebanon. U.S. peacekeeping operations in
Beirut (1982-3), Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983), Operation Eldorado Canyon
(Libya, 1986) all highlighted a requirement for an inexpensive, over the horizon,
unmanned reconnaissance capability for the on-scene tactical commander. In July 1985,
the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman directed the expeditious acquisition of UAVs for
fleet operations. By December 1985, the U.S. Navy procured the Pioneer UAV system
developed by IAI. The Pioneer UAV is the next generation UAV following the Mastiff
that was employed in the Peace for Galilee campaign. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
began establishing UAV units in 1986. The first Pioneer overseas deployment occurred
in December 1986, aboard the U.S.S. Iowa (Pioneer UAV Inc., 1999).
The first time the Pioneer UAV saw combat action was in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm (Melson, Englander & Dawson, 1992). During that conflict, six
UAV units were deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) - two Navy, three
Marine Corps and one Army. Together, the units flew 336 missions, accruing 985 flight
hours. Only three UAVs were hit by enemy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), resulting in the
loss of only one UAV from enemy action. General Walter Boomer, USMC (ret.) who
commanded the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the Kuwaiti theater summed up
the effect of UAV employment during the war when he said, "The Pioneer UAV was the
most significant intelligence collection source within I MEF."
Pioneer UAV units were later deployed for Operations Restore and Continue
Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Joint Endeavor
in Bosnia. Their successful mission performance reinforced the potential of exploiting
this technology to support future combat operations and operations other than war
(OOTW) (Jenkins, 1998). The Department of the Navy's doctrine of "Operational
Maneuver from the Sea" (OMFTS) will place greater reliance on battlefield surveillance
from "over the horizon" and expeditionary sites ashore in order to control a greater
operational area with less force concentration. Relatively inexpensive reconnaissance
UAVs with the ability to conduct missions in hostile airspace, without putting pilots into
harm's way is a key element of OMFTS (Marine Corps Combat Development Command
[MCCDC], 1999).
C. THE PIONEER UAV SYSTEM
A Pioneer UAV system consists of five Pioneer air vehicles, a ground control
station (GCS), a portable control station (PCS), a tracking communications unit (TCU), a
data link, two remote receiver stations (RRS) and a reconnaissance payload. The system
can be operated aboard specially configured U.S.S. Austin Class Landing Platform Dock
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(LPD-4) ships or from prepared airstrips ashore. While UAVs do not carry any ordnance,
they can perform as forward observers of indirect fire support assets - offensive attack
aviation, artillery and naval surface fire support. Figure 1 is a representation of how
UAVs can be deployed during an amphibious operation.
LRE Launct
MCE Missio i Control Element
LOS Line of Sight
Figure 1 : Pioneer UAV Concept of Operations
Within DoD, only the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and the Defense UAV Training
Command (DUTC) operate the Pioneer UAV (MAWTS-1, 1997). The Navy's UAV unit
is VC-6, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia; however, the UAV elements are located at
Webster Field, Patuxet River, Maryland. From there, they deploy as detachments with a
complete Pioneer system aboard ship. There are two Marine Corps UAV units. VMU-1
is located in Twenty-Nine Palms, California, and VMU-2 is headquartered at MCAS
Cherry Point, North Carolina. The training command, DUTC, is located in Fort
Huachuca, Arizona. The U.S. Army deactivated their Pioneer UAV units in anticipation
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of procuring the Hunter (IAI) or Outrider (Alliant Techsystems) UAV system. However,
both programs were cancelled because they failed to meet desired size, weight and
corrosion control specifications (Sherman, 1998).
Pioneer UAV units are currently tasked to provide the following missions:
a) Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA).
b) Adjusting indirect fire (Artillery, Naval Surface Fire Support).
c) Collect Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
d) Support security operations (e.g., convoy escort, monitor enemy
avenues of approach and named areas of interest (NAIs).
The term "unmanned" is a misnomer when applied to the Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle system because UAV operations involve many remote participants. The essential
members of a UAV crew include a Mission Commander, an Internal Pilot, a Payload
Operator and an External Pilot. Additionally launch and recovery teams and maintenance
personnel will be involved in flight operations (Joint UAV Training Operations
Procedures & Standardization [JUAVTOPS], 1997). A detailed description of the
Pioneer UAV system, capabilities and crew responsibilities is attached as Appendix A.
D. PIONEER UAV SAFETY RECORD
Schmidt & Parker (1995), of the Naval Safety Center (NSC), begin the initial
effort at improving UAV operational readiness by focusing on mishap prevention. Their
study examines the 107 mishaps that occurred between 1986 and 1993. The breakdown
of causal factors is illustrated in Figure 2. This research indicates a significant number
(approximately 59%) of mishaps occur as a result of electromechanical problems.
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Human error accounts for nearly one-third of these mishaps. Their research indicates the
following factors present significant safety concerns: crew selection and training;
aeromedical readiness; pilot proficiency/currency; personnel shortages; operational tempo










Figure 2: FY 86- FY 94 Naval Pioneer UAV Mishap Causal Factors (Schmidt & Parker, 1995)
Schmidt & Parker (1995) recommend the following corrective actions be taken to
decrease the mishap rate: aeromedical screening and monitoring; criteria based selection
process; UAV crew coordination training; take off, landing and external pilot (EP)
simulators; inclusion into OPNAVLNST 3710.7P NATOPS oversight and improved
human systems integration. These recommendations have been implemented with
varying degrees of success. Aeromedical screening is conducted prior to being assigned
to the UAV community. In addition, aptitude testing is conducted to assess the flight
potential of incoming aircrew. Aircrew coordination training (ACT) is currently in
progress and constantly evolving. A take off and landing drone was developed to enable
EPs to fly an air vehicle without having the entire system activated. In FY 94, UAV
flight operations were included in the Naval Aviation Safety Program (OPNAVENST
3750.6Q).
These improvements have marginally decreased the mishap rate. However,
improvement is still required. Initially, aeromedical screening takes place but a flight
surgeon is not assigned to UAV units to continue aeromedical education and crew
monitoring. The lack of operational experience and personnel stability in UAV units
limits ACT because lessons learned are difficult to capture and implement. Additionally,
emergency action simulation drills are not possible because there is no crew simulator.
Air vehicle drones, called MiGs by their crews, do not have the same aerodynamic
characteristics of the Pioneer air vehicle. Thus, while the MiG training is effective in
training the EPs in basic flight controls and procedures, the discrepancies between its
response and that of the real Pioneer vehicle may reinforce improper handling and result
in a negative learning experience.
Seagle (1997) continues the work of Schmidt & Parker. He applies the Human
Factors Mishap Classification System (HFACS) to analyze UAV mishaps from 1986 to
1997. His research studies the 203 mishap investigation reports from 1986 through 1997,
determining that 88 include human related causal factors. His categorization of mishaps
is illustrated in Table 1. His work provides insight into the cause of human factors
related mishaps and clarifies the broad, generalized "human error" labels. Seagle goes
further by demonstrating that although the primary cause of an accident may have been
electro-mechanical in nature, a latent cause was due potentially to human factors, either
contributing to the mishap, or failing to correct a condition that led to the accident.
CAUSAL FACTOR CODE # FREQ
Unsafe Act UA 52 59.1%
Intended UAI 6 6.8%
Mistake UALM 34 38.6%
Violation UAIV 6 6.8%
Unintended UAU 46 52.3%
Slip UAUS 2 2.2%
Lapse UAUL 14 15.9%
Unsafe Condition UC 40 45.5%
Aeromedical UCA 18 20.4%
CRM UCC 24 27.2%
Readiness UCV 6 6.8%
Unsafe Supervision US 54 61.4
Unforeseen USU 30 34.1%
Foreseen USF 41 46.5%
Human Factors HF 88
Table 1 : FY86 - FY97 UAV Mishaps Parsed by Causal Category (Seagle, 1997)
Seagle confirms Schmidt & Parker's recommendations for a full crew simulator to
enhance the rehearsal of ACT and flight emergency drills. He also reports a trend in the
following categories: loss of situational awareness, lack or loss of depth perception,
visual illusions, self-medication and fatigue. In 1996, the Navy's Bureau of Medicine
(BUMED) incorporated medical standards for UAV aircrew to address these factors.
Seagle also proposes an automatic, "hands off landing system for runway arrestment and
embarked net recoveries with an override capability for the EP or LP in the case of
degraded operations. He attributes the lack of urgency in implementation of these efforts
to the UAV community having no "champion" at the flag officer level. The relatively
inexperienced and young officers who serve in the UAV community have not reached (or
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may never reach) the rank where they can affect change, unlike officers in manned
aviation careers.
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to further identify the causal factors resulting in the
unacceptable number of UAV mishaps. Particular emphasis is placed on human factors
related mishaps. Once identified the study constructs a stochastic model to evaluate
mishap intervention initiatives with the goal of mishap reduction in terms of cost and
mission readiness. The results of the model are presented to allow decision-makers to
focus on specific accident causation categories and to choose the most efficient and
effective intervention strategies for further development.
F. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Since its fielding in 1986, the Pioneer has accumulated a Class A mishap rate of
385 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. When this is compared to the manned aviation
Class A mishap rate of approximately two mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, one sees the
Homeric proportions of this unacceptable situation. The excessive UAV mishap rate
translates into significant budgetary cost, degradation in mission readiness, and a
perception of unreliability by fleet users and those whom they support. Steps must be
taken to bridge the gap between conceptual capability and actual performance. The
bottom line is to achieve a dramatic reduction in the UAV mishap rate to an acceptable
level, to sustain mission readiness, and to minimize mishap costs. Specific research goals
include the following:
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1. The classification of UAV mishaps under the current aviation mishap
taxonomy. Additionally, the identification the human factors characteristics that
significantly impact the UAV mishap rate.
2. The development of a stochastic model of UAV mishaps which can be used to
accurately represent mishap occurrences.
3. The use of the model to analyze the effects of mishap reduction intervention
strategies.
4. The identification of the impact of a particular intervention strategy on cost
savings and mission readiness improvement.
G. DEFINITIONS
Mishap . A naval mishap is an unplanned event or series of events directly
involving naval aircraft, which results in $10,000 or greater cumulative damage to naval
aircraft or personnel injury. Aviation flight mishaps are divided into one of three
categories based on the severity of the damage, and the cost incurred by the mishap. The
definitions governing each class of mishap is given in Naval Publication OPNAVINST
3750.6Q.
Class A Mishap : A class A mishap occurs when the total amount of damage
exceeds $1,000,000 or if the air vehicle is destroyed. Because the total cost of a Pioneer
UAV is approximately $1.1 million, a class A mishap will only occur if the UAV is
damaged beyond repair or lost. Class A mishaps include being lost at sea, or destruction
of the air vehicle if it forcefully impacts terrain. Loss of a UAV during a combat mission
is not classified as a class A mishap, but rather, a combat loss.
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Class B Mishap : This category is used when the total cost of damage is at least
$200,000 but less than $1,000,000. Usually, a UAV class B mishap occurs when there is
serious damage to the air vehicle, or if the payload is damaged. The cost of the
surveillance camera alone ranges from $300,000 to $800,000 depending on whether it is
the day EO or night FLIR camera. The variance of the cost depends upon whether the
payload is repairable or permanently damaged.
Class C Mishap : This category is used when the total cost of damage is at least
$10,000 but less than $200,000. For UAV mishaps, this situation occurs when there is a
small amount of damage to the air vehicle possibly from a hard landing, or striking
another object. Usually, swapping out or remanufacturing parts can repair these types of
mishaps, keeping costs low.
H. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this research is limited to the Defense UAV Training Command, and
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps fleet Pioneer UAV squadrons. However, the results of this
analysis will be pertinent to all UAV operations of current and future systems that
integrate a human component to conduct the mission. Detailed mishap analysis is
conducted from FY93 through FY98. In FY93, UAVs were incorporated into the Naval
Aviation Safety system, and mishap reporting procedures were standardized. Prior to
FY93, UAV mishap reports contained limited descriptive information, rendering detailed
analysis nearly impossible. Mishap causes were typically described as pilot error,
electrical or mechanical failure with little amplifying information.
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The contents of the thesis are presented in the following order: Chapter Two is a
literature review of three human error causation models. They serve to provide
background to the HFACS model used by the NSC, which in turn is discussed in detail
with specific examples of UAV applications. Chapter Two also discusses accident
investigations and analysis, mishap intervention strategies, and stochastic modeling.
Chapter Three describes the methods used to estimate statistical parameters, which are
inputs to the stochastic model. Further, the simulation methodology is developed.
Chapter Four includes the mishap database construction, parameter estimates and the
output of the stochastic model simulation. Conclusions and recommended courses of




A. ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES
The Asia-Pacific Safety Magazine (March, 1995), published by the Australian
Bureau of Air Safety Investigations, reports "between 70% and 80% of [mishap]
occurrences contain a human factors element." The article continues, "Indeed it can be
argued that human factors are involved in all occurrences." In a system designed, built,
maintained and operated by humans, only a fraction of one percent of the mishaps can be
attributed to factors beyond human control (Bruggink, 1996).
Because of society's obvious goal to reduce the number of aviation mishaps and
eventually their overall prevention, much research has been dedicated to determining
accident causation, and developing a safe environment where the probability of having an
accident is minimized (Hade, 1993). Nevertheless, the results of aviation accident
investigations often limit conclusions to phrases such as "pilot error," "failure to see and
avoid," "improper use of controls," or "failure to observe and adhere to established
standard operating procedures (SOPs).
"However, effective accident intervention and prevention requires more than
identifying who is culpable. In order to implement a safety conscious program, a better
understanding of the context in which these individuals faced accident conducive
circumstances is required.
Within the last thirty years, three accident causation theories stand out for their
merits in dissecting the myriad of contributing causal factors that create the context of an
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incident. These three theories are Edward's (1977) "SHEL" model; Helmreich's (1990)
model; and the Reasons (1990) "Swiss Cheese" model. Each of the three theories
attempts to explore the latent or removed factors that influence the mishap. The main
focus is on the "chain of events" and surrounding circumstances that lead to an accident.
1. The SHEL Model
The "SHEL" (Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware) model is first
introduced by Edwards (1972) and later modified by Hawkins (1984). The SHEL model
places emphasis on the human being and its interfaces with the other components of the
man-machine-environment system. Each component of the SHEL model represents the
components of a modern technological system as depicted in Figure 3.
Environment
Figure 3: The SHEL Model
The human operator is set at the center of the model, and must interact with each
of the four external components. The edges of the blocks are not simple or straight,
indicating that the human must be matched with each component in order to function
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properly. A mismatch between blocks, or an improper fit is a potential cause for human
error. In order to analyze the human factors aspects of an environment, one must look at
both the individual component blocks, and also their interface (Harle, 1993). The
following is a brief description of each component of the model:
a) Human Operator
The human operator is the hub of the SHEL model. As such, analysis of
the individual must incorporate four categories: physical, physiological, psychological,
and psychosocial. Physically, one must determine if the individual is capable of
performing the required task, and if there are any impediments or limitations to successful
task performance. Physiologically, an individual must be prepared to conduct the task.
This category includes the items of proper nutrition, alcohol or drug use, tobacco use,
stress and fatigue, and the effect these have on an individual or crew's ability to perform
and make appropriate decisions. Psychologically, an individual must be capable of
mentally executing the task. Knowledge of what is required, and the confidence to
perform the task must be established. Moreover, the workload must be appropriate to an
individuals information processing and attention capabilities. Finally, psychosocial
factors impact human performance. Stress, pressure from a supervisor, the workplace
climate and personal issues all influence ones reaction in a potentially dangerous
situation.
b) Liveware
The liveware interface is the operator's relationship to the other individuals
in the workplace. In aviation, this is often referred to as crew resource management
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(CRM) and is addressed later. Liveware also relates to teamwork, morale and the overall
command climate. Obviously, healthy interpersonal relationships among a crew, or
between individuals and their supervisors are essential for a safe and effective work
environment.
c) Hardware
The hardware interface addresses the human machine interface (HMI).
The HMI includes workspace configuration, displays, controls, seat design and
configuration, visibility and climatic conditions. The physical work environment impacts
crew orientation, information processing, cognition and execution of the task. Similarities
of component design and their physical layout can affect effective scan patterns, and
facilitate correlation of input data. The hardware interface is the focus of ergonomic and
anthropometrical study.
d) Software
The software interface is the relationship between the individual and all
supporting systems found in the workplace. This category includes not only computer
software design, but also regulations, manuals, checklists, and SOPs. These items must
be user friendly and understandable to the human operator. Automation is also a
significant contributor to the software human interface. An entirely automated system
may have the tendency to breed complacency and boredom for an operator resulting in
decreased vigilance. On the other hand, the lack of automation can cause task saturation
tor an operator in extreme situations, also resulting in an unsafe environment.
is
e) Environment
The environmental interface is the relationship between the operator and
the internal and external environment. The internal environment includes temperature,
lighting, noise, vibration and air quality. The external environment includes visibility,
weather and terrain. For military applications, the external environment includes the
combat situation during which operations must be executed. The surrounding
environment has significant impact on individual and crew motivation, attention,
judgment and performance.
2. The Helmreich Model
Helmreich advised the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Commission of Inquiry on the human factors aspects of an Air Ontario flight accident that
took place in Dryden, Ontario in 1990 (Zotov, 1996). The advantage of his theory is that
it eliminates an opportunity for regulators and organizations to argue that their actions
should not be discussed in the accident report. It is frequently argued that an accident is
the end result of a chain of events: if a causal factor can be removed and the accident
could still have occurred, then ipso facto that factor cart not be causal. The Helmreich
model illustrates that an accident is the accumulation of factors, rather than their chaining
together, which affects a crew's performance.
The Helmreich model can be envisioned as a series of concentric circles
surrounding an operator or crew. Each ring potentially influences the crew and may
cause a degradation of performance. The four levels of influence are the regulatory
environment, the organizational environment, the physical environment, and the crew
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environment (see figure 4). Accidents occur as the result actions taken within the context
of this crew environment.
Figure 4: Helmreich Model of Accident Causation
a) Regulatory Environment
The regulatory environment is the guidance for conducting operations.
Within Naval aviation, this includes NATOPS procedures, the Training and Readiness
(T&R) manual, unit SOPs, operations orders and commanders guidance. These
regulations guide supervisors on how to conduct mission planning and execution within
certain limitations. Examples of these regulations are proficiency and currency
requirements, crew rest and approved flight profiles.
b) Organizational Environment
The organizational environment includes crew composition and its
performance. Consistent training, personnel stability, OPTEMPO and leadership
contribute to the organizational environment. On the micro level, the interface between
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operations and maintenance personnel, and on the macro level between a unit and is
higher and adjacent units within the command and control structure greatly influence the
organizational environment and the niche into which a crew fits.
c) Physical Environment
The physical environment is consistent with the internal and external
environments of the SHEL model. It also includes the physical condition of equipment at
the time of an incident, and what affect that had on mission performance. The model
recognizes that the surroundings of an individual or crew have a significant impact on the
vigilance and responsiveness of the operator.
d) The Crew Environment
The crew environment comprises the interpersonal coordination and
communication within a crew. The model also extends the crew definition to include its
interfaces with external control, such as air traffic (ATC) and enroute controllers.
Anyone associated with the conduct of a mission is de facto part of the extended crew.
The crew environment is also influenced by CRM. Finally, the crew is further broken
down into individual components. Individuals possess their own performance strengths,
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
The Helmreich model of accident causation is crew centered. However, instead of
"blaming" the crew or individuals on the crew, it looks at the context of the accident that
arises from the faulty actions or decisions by external agencies. These contributing
factors, although potentially missing from the "chain of events" are equally influential in
an accident occurrence (Zotov, 1996).
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3. The "Swiss Cheese" Model
The "Swiss Cheese" model is the outgrowth of research examining human error
by Reason (1990). The model discusses the layers of defense used to protect against
accident occurrences. Reason's model identifies four layers that potentially contribute to
an accident: organizational influences, unsafe supervision, unsafe conditions and








Figure 5: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
In an ideal world, the defensive layers would be intact, preventing the "accident
trajectory," as depicted in the diagram by the arrow, from passing through to the accident
event. However, each layer has weaknesses and gaps that are revealed by the holes. In
the real world, these holes are not fixed and static, otherwise they could be identified and
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repaired. Reason (1998) describes the holes as dynamic and in a constant state of flux.
Local conditions drive which defensive layer comes in and out of the frame at a particular
time.
Reason (1998) attributes the holes as either active failures, or latent conditions.
Active failures are either violations or errors that occur in the immediate vicinity of the
accident occurrence. They are performed by the operators - pilots, air traffic controllers,
police officers, control room operators, maintenance personnel, and so on. The discovery
and mitigation of this active failure immediately prior to the accident would most likely
prevent the accident from happening. Twenty years ago, the discovery of this unsafe act
would have ended an accident investigation. However in today's climate, unsafe acts are
seen more as consequences than principle causes. It is recognized that people working in
complex systems make errors or violate procedures for reasons that go beyond an
individual. These causes are called latent conditions.
Latent conditions can be present for many years before they combine with local
circumstances and active failures to penetrate they systems layers of defense. Examples
of latent conditions include poor design, improper training and supervision, undetected
manufacturing defects or poor design, unworkable procedures, or improper automation.
At the macro level, government, regulator or corporate policy shapes the organizational
culture, creating the error producing factors within an individual environment.
Latent conditions are present in all systems and are an inevitable part of the
organizational culture. Latent conditions are not bad policy decisions, but can result from
the demands of a limited budget or manpower management constraints. These latent
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conditions can lie dormant for years and have no impact until they become manifested at
a time where particular weaknesses in the defense become exposed. In contrast to active
failures, which tend to be unique to a specific event, latent conditions can go
unrecognized and can contribute to a number of different accidents. Latent conditions
increase the likelihood of active failures through the creation of local factors allowing
error and violations to occur (Reason, 1998).
B. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy as
developed by Shappell & Wiegmann (1997) at the Naval Safety Center (NSC), is based
on Reason's concept of human error in accident causation. HFACS also incorporates,
albeit to a lesser extent, components of the SHEL and Helmreich model to define the
context surrounding an accident. The HFACS taxonomy will be added to the next
publication of OPNAVINST 3750 and become the standardized methodology adopted by
the Naval Aviation Safety Program for human factors mishap investigation. HFACS
attempts to capture the context in which an accident occurs by categorized failures into
four separate tiers depicted in Figure 6. These tiers are organizational influences, unsafe
supervision, unsafe conditions, and unsafe acts. For the purposes of this discussion, each









Figure 6: HFACS Mishap Causation Categories
1. Organizational Influences
The first HFACS tier of mishap causation is organizational influences.
Organizational influences are often difficult to quantify and can rarely be tied as a
specific cause to an accident. However, their existence certainly contributes to the
circumstances surrounding an accident. The author discussed these influences with UAV
crewmembers at VMU-1, VMU-2 and VC-6. Among aviators, there is a perception that a
UAV tour shows a lack of competitiveness with one's peers who are in a flying billet in
their primary airframe. Being assigned to the UAV unit relegates them to the status of a
second-class citizen. In contrast, several see the UAV field as an opportunity to excel in a
challenging and developing community. As such, they channel their drive and energy to
guarantee success.
Another organizational influence is the lack of a UAV specialty and career path.
Until 1996, UAV enlisted personnel did not have a specific rating or military operational
specialty (MOS). As a result, personnel were assigned to a UAV unit with no previous
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background, underwent training and left the unit three years later, never to return again.
Initial accessions to UAV units were recruited by advertising for individuals whose hobby
was remote control airplanes. Initially, a unit could be made up of truck drivers,
mechanics, yeomen, or any combination of backgrounds. The establishment of enlisted
specialties has improved the situation. Nevertheless, there are no officer specialties or
career paths. It is still the case that an officer will only serve one tour in a UAV unit
before leaving the community. Typically, all officers in a UAV unit, including the
commanding officer, will be new to the community upon assignment (MAWTS-1, 1997).
A third organizational influence within the UAV community is the perception by
others in the aviation field. Besides the normal rivalries that exist among communities,
aviators typically relegate UAV crews to being the lowest on the totem pole. Often, their
inclusion in aviation planning and operations in regarded as a nuisance by those who do
not understand the unique integration requirements that UAV operations must address.
These organizational conditions, unhealthy at times, can create an environment
susceptible to unsafe operations and potentially lead to mishap causation.
2. Unsafe Supervision
Unsafe supervision is the second HFACS tier that contributes to an actual mishap
occurrence. Unsafe supervision can be both unforeseen and foreseen. Unforeseen unsafe
supervision includes unrecognized unsafe operations, inadequate documentation and
inadequate design. Unrecognized unsafe operations result from a supervisor not
recognizing an unsafe act or condition. For example, a supervisor may not be aware of
accumulated fatigue among aircrew or maintenance personnel in a unit. Instead of taking
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corrective action, the situation is ignored. Also, by not being aware of influences on
individuals, crew assignments and personnel management suffer. An example is the
supervisor who is not aware that a crewmember has a sick spouse or child, a recent death
in the family, or marital difficulty. As a result, the supervisor does not know to take these
adverse mental conditions into account when making crew assignments.
Inadequate documentation refers to unknown "bugs" in the system. Designed for
combat, the Pioneer was not fully tested until Operation Desert Storm. Operational
testing and training are designed to closely resemble combat, but cannot replicate it.
During Operation Desert Storm, the Marine Pioneer units operated as part of a full scale
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). A microwave antenna/transmitter was located at the
UAV airstrip for communications. The microwave signal caused electro-mechanical
interference (EMI) with the UAV uplink and downlink causing loss of vehicle control
resulting in crashes on several occasions. Because the Pioneer had not previously
operated in close proximity to this specific communications equipment, this condition
was neither realized nor documented.
Inadequate design is an extension of inadequate documentation in that an
inadequate condition exists that is unintentional. The engineers who designed the
equipment may not have anticipated requirements for certain performance characteristics
or capabilities. Although it may seem inconceivable for a naval UAV, the Pioneer was
not built to fly through rain or visible moisture. It was designed by the Israeli Aircraft
Industries (IAI) for operations in arid areas around Israel. It has a laminated wooden
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propeller that delaminates in moisture, and the electronic components on the air vehicle
are not waterproof. This inadequate design has been the cause of several UAV mishaps.
Foreseen unsafe supervision is the mismanagement of individuals at the personal
level. It includes the lack of or inadequate supervision, the failure to correct a known
problem, or a supervisory violation. Foreseen unsafe supervision is a lack of leadership
and guidance in a crew or in the entire unit that creates an unsafe situation for flight
operations. Within a unit, this can be an underlying condition that is reflected in lack of
discipline, operational focus or morale. Unsafe supervision is rarely an isolated instance,
but is symptomatic of underlying conditions, which can all lead to a mishap.
3. Unsafe Conditions
Reason (1990) addresses the category of unsafe conditions in accident causation,
however Shappell & Wiegmann's (1997) HFACS taxonomy further subdivides these
conditions into aeromedical, crew resource management and readiness violations. The
following paragraphs characterize each of these subdivisions. Additionally, each
subdivision is discussed within the context of UAV community issues.
a) Aeromedical Conditions
Aeromedical conditions include the physiological and mental condition of
individuals, and their physical and mental limitations. The physiological condition of an
individual includes the functioning of their sensory system and physical condition. A
UAV crewmember may experience spatial disorientation or visual illusions caused by the
remote controls of the air vehicle. Unlike manned aviation where pilots incorporate
vestibular inputs with visual cues to perceive the attitude and motion of the aircraft, a
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UAV operator does not have those inputs. In order to operate effectively as a
crewmember, there are required sensory thresholds that must be maintained. In addition
to the senses, other physical conditions can affect the crewmember. Though not
exhaustive, medications, fatigue, change in circadian rhythm, hypoglycemia, use of
alcohol, or vitamin deficiencies can cause a person to be physically unqualified to
conduct a mission (Edwards, 1990).
The adverse mental condition of a crewmember is also an aeromedical
condition that can adversely affect mission performance. The effects of stress and mental
workload on human performance are widely documented. Both can cause a loss of
situational awareness, mental fatigue and task saturation. Additionally, personality traits
and attitudes such as overconfidence, complacency, misplaced motivation, or a desire to
please, cause an adverse mental state. Increased OPTEMPO, and associated family
separations, financial concerns, operational or combat fatigue and competition among
members of a crew, all potentially combine to create the adverse mental conditions that
can cause an accident (Hawkins, 1987). The final aeromedical contribution to unsafe
conditions is the physical and mental limitations of the crewmember. Individuals must be
physically and mentally screened for selection as UAV aircrew in order to prevent the
environment for the previously discussed conditions to occur.
b) Crew Resource Management
Jensen (1995) defines crew resource management (CRM) as the effective
use of all resources (hardware, software, and liveware) to achieve safe and efficient flight
operations. The resources that a crew manages are people (other crewmembers),
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equipment (instruments and controls) and other items such as charts, checklists and
operational manuals. UAV operations, as stated earlier, involve a crew of at least four,
and normally more crewmembers. The competency and experience of these individuals,
their supervision, their interpersonal communication and the remote aspect of the air
vehicle from the operational control site combine to make unique CRM demands on a
UAV crew. The crew must communicate via an intercom system (ICS) and
crewmembers often cannot establish eye contact with one another. Additionally, not all
crewmembers have access to flight instrument information. As the number of
crewmembers goes up, the potential for conflicting interpretations of information also
increases, potentially causing confusion and indecisive actions.
c) Readiness
Readiness violations refer to violations of standard operating procedures
(SOPs), rules, and instructions designed to provide a safe operating environment for flight
operations. Among other things, NATOPS defines regulations on crew rest, self-
medication and alcohol consumption. In the Marine Corps, the Training and Readiness
(T&R) Manuals (MCO 3500.21: Volumes I and VI), define crew proficiency and
currency requirements for an individual conducting a specified mission. Violations of
any of these regulations can create unsafe conditions for a mission.
4. Unsafe Acts
The fourth HFACS tier is unsafe acts, which can be classified as either intended
or unintended. Intended acts are either mistakes or violations, whereas, unintended acts
are either slips or lapses. The following paragraphs characterize each of these
30
subdivisions. Additionally, each subdivision is discussed within the context of UAV
community issues.
a) Intended Acts
Mistakes are failures to formulate the correct intentions, and can result
from shortcomings of perception, memory and cognition. In these cases, the intended
action is wrong. Knowledge based mistakes are caused by failures to understand the
situation and arriving at an incorrect course of action. In this situation a UAV operator
may be saturated with raw information, and may not be able to process the data to
formulate the correct actions. Also, because of inexperience, an operator does not have
the capacity to assimilate the information given to formulate a correct response.
In contrast, someone with more experience who misapplies a rule under
certain conditions usually makes a rule-based error. A rule-based decision can be likened
to if... then logic. These mistakes normally occur in one of three ways. The first is that a
rule is followed, but exceptions to the situation are not noted. An example is a UAV
operator who has been operating from a shore location and is now operating at sea.
Emergency procedures that are learned and reinforced through training ashore may not be
applicable or desirable at sea. A mistake occurs when the operator applies a land-based
procedure at sea and an accident occurs. The second type of rule based mistake is when
the if... part of the situation is misinterpreted, and the ...then action is inappropriately
applied. And finally, the third type of rule based mistake is when the if.
.
. observation is
correct and the ...then action is incorrectly applied. (Wickens, 1992)
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In contrast to mistakes, violations are the willful breaking of rules or
procedures. Violations can be categorized into routine or exceptional violations. A
routine violation tends to be habitual in nature and is typical of an individual's behavioral
repertoire. An example of a UAV related routine violation is when a crewmember
habitually fails to follow the unit SOP or NATOPS procedures. This can be as harmless
as failing to brief a certain emergency procedure during a pre-flight brief. Lack of
supervision and correction action acerbates the violation by passively reinforcing
incorrect procedures. On the other hand, an exceptional violation is an isolated departure
from authority, neither typical of the individual nor condoned by supervisors. The
deliberate decision to ignore directions from an air controller is an example of an
exceptional violation.
b) Unintended Actions
A slip is an unintended error in which the correct intention is incorrectly
carried out, as opposed to a mistake where the incorrect intention is correctly carried out.
For example, the internal pilot (IP) uses dials to control the speed and altitude of the air
vehicle. Intending to adjust the UAV airspeed and inadvertently changing the altitude
dial is an example of a slip. According to Wickens (1992), slips occur for three reasons:
(1) the intended action involves a slight departure from the routine, frequently performed
action; (2) some characteristics of the stimulus environment or action sequence closely
relate to the inappropriate, but more frequent action; and (3) the action sequence is
automated and therefore, not monitored closely by attention.
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Finally, a lapse is the failure to carry out an action. Memory failure,
memory overload, or interruption can cause a lapse. Prior to every UAV mission, all
members of the UAV crew perform various tasks as outlined in a preflight checklist. If
that sequence of events is interrupted unexpectantly, requiring the crew or an individual
to divert attention and then come back to the pre-flight sequence, a particular step may be
skipped. This momentary distraction can cause a lapse to occur with unknown
consequences.
C. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTS
Bruggink's (1996) research in civil aviation points out that accident reporting is
too preoccupied with reactive, formal responses to stated accident causes. Typical
investigations focus on the black and white elements of accident causes. Since the role of
human factors is often a gray area, it can seldom be accommodated by the rules of
evidence favored by investigating authorities. Emphasis is placed upon direct cause-
effect relationships, and causal statements become official designators of blame. The
inclusion of contributing factors to causal statements perpetuates a distinction between
primary causes and contributing factors that has the effect of lessening their relationship
to the accident. McAdams, a senior and respected member of the National Transportation
and Safety Board (NTSB) commented after a 1978 mid-air collision investigation that: "A
contributing factor is not a primary cause; it is more remote and does not carry the same
weight or implications as that of a probable cause." (Bruggink, 1996) As a result, the
context of the situation is dismissed easier than the individual acts themselves.
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Zotov (1996) also concludes that there exists reluctance to closely analysis human
factors related causal factors. Often investigations lead to personal attacks, legal
obstruction and corporate pressure on the investigating authority if the entire "system" is
under investigation. A corporation will attempt a legal response that frees them from
culpability by using the "chain of causation" approach to accident occurrences.
Additionally, the legal concept of "remoteness of damage" can make it difficult to present
the concept of a complex network of interacting events that caused an accident.
Mayer & Ellingstad (1992) state that accident databases frequently describe
attributes of the physical environment and equipment, but that detailed analysis of
accident causes, including human factors information, are frequently not represented
because they are too difficult to obtain and code. Engineers and front-line operators
design most accident reporting systems with limited backgrounds in human factors. This
results in a lack of suitability for addressing human factors issues. Naval Aviation is
continuing to attempt addressing this shortcoming through the Naval Aviation Safety
Program.
The purpose of the Naval Aviation safety program is to preserve both human and
material resources in order to enhance operational readiness. In order to accomplish this
goal, damage and injury must be addressed to mitigate the hazards inherent in flight
operations (OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, 1997). The use of HFACS in mishap reporting is
designed to improve the quality of mishap reports, which will in turn improve the data
available for analysis. With a higher quality database available, mishap analysts can
isolate recurring causal factors and recommend suitable strategies to eliminate or reduce
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the frequency of these accidents. These intervention strategies can then be evaluated for
their effectiveness in improving operational readiness and reducing budgetary losses.
D. MISHAP INTERVENTION STRATEGIES
Mishap intervention strategies are designed to address common mishap causes
and decrease the probability of their occurring. Typically, these strategies fall into one of
three categories: engineering controls, policy and procedures and individual protection
measures. Engineering controls deal with a physical reconfiguration of the system. It
may be ergonomic, or mechanical in nature. The result of the change is improved system
performance. Policy and procedures address the circumstances surrounding operations.
Within the HFACS model, these strategies reflect mishaps in the unsafe conditions and
unsafe supervision. Changes in flight prerequisites and improved time to train are
examples of policy modifications. Individual protection refers to the equipment a person
may use to decrease the possibility of physical injury due to operations. This study
addresses seven mishap intervention strategies.
7. Aeromedical Screening and Education
Among the recommendations made by Schmidt & Parker (1995) several are
associated with aeromedical screening and monitoring. Currently, this is taking place
prior to assignment to UAV training. However once initial training is complete, a flight
surgeon is not assigned to each UAV unit. There still exists a perception that UAV
crewmembers are just like any other ground community, where crew rest and other
requirements are perceived as a luxury and not a requirement. Additionally, ongoing
training is not routinely conducted to address the affects of nutrition, alcohol and tobacco
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use, stress and psychological readiness on mission performance. The first intervention
strategy addressed is continuing and increasing the education and follow up attention to
aeromedical issues and their effect on readiness. This intervention strategy is a policy and
procedure change and is modeled by the unsafe condition (UC) causation category.
2. Aircrew Coordination Training I Crew Resource Management
The policy and procedural recommendation for mishap intervention is increased
aircrew coordination training (ACT)/CRM. This is being conducted in UAV units;
however, the lack of experience among crewmembers limits its effectiveness. Because
UAV operators are cyclically new to the community, there is no senior leadership that can
speak with a voice of experience to situations that may occur during a flight. Aviators on
the crew bring a generic ACT background to a unit, but lack specific UAV applications.
This results in a reactive rather than deliberate approach to an emergency situation.
Improved, standardized training will impact mishaps caused by unsafe acts (UA) and
unsafe conditions (UC).
3. UAV Flight Simulator
A UAV mission simulator can further enhance mission performance skills and
mitigate unsafe actions during the conduct of a flight. Schmidt & Parker (1995) find that
59% of mishaps occurred as a result of electrical, mechanical or engine failure. If these
situations can be replicated via simulation, a crew can rehearse procedures to correct the
problem, or put the aircraft in an attitude where damage is minimized. Currently the
Pioneer does not have a simulation capability where an instructor can induce such an
emergency, observe the crew response, and then debrief the crew on their performance.
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The only time the entire crew can operate as a team to address an emergency is during an
actual flight. A replacement to the GCS is under development as the Tactical Control
System (TCS). The TCS is designed to be a universal ground control and
communications shelter that has the ability to interface with all follow-on DoD UAV
systems. One of the TCS's requirements is the ability to conduct simulator training
without conducting an actual mission. The model addresses unit training procedures and
is modeled in the unsafe act (UA) category.
4. Automated Take offand Landing System
Schmidt & Parker attribute 32% of mishaps to take-off and landing error.
Although not currently a requirement for future UAV systems, several contractors are
developing an automated take-off and landing system. Their concept is to fly the UAV to
a predetermined handover point where it flies into a radio beacon. The beacon then takes
over sending navigational information to the UAV until it is safely on deck. There would
also be a manual override system. This engineering control will lower the incidents of
unsafe acts (UA) during the takeoff and landing phase of the flight.
5. Personnel Stabilization
In order to lessen the effects of unsafe supervision as well as unsafe acts. The
UAV community can establish officer specialty codes and career progression
possibilities. The current situation of constantly rotating first time supervisors into UAV
units causes instability and limits the "corporate knowledge" of squadron members. If
implemented, supervisory and performance skills will dramatically improve. The policy
change is modeled by the unsafe acts (UA) and unsafe supervision (US) categories.
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6. Engine Replacement
Although not human factors related, engine failure has been attributed to one
quarter of UAV mishaps (Schmidt & Parker, 1995). Engineering modifications replacing
the current engine with a more reliable engine is modeled in the analysis section.
7. Electronic Waterproofing
Like engine failures, electronic failures account for another quarter of UAV
mishaps. Although not originally designed as a naval UAV, the Pioneer is operated by
the U.S. naval services and would benefit by environmental shielding. The affect of
engineering modifications such as water proofing system components for operation at sea,
in the littorals, and in foul weather is addressed.
E. STOCHASIC MODELING
Ross (1997) states that in making a mathematical model for a real world
phenomenon, it is always necessary to make simplifying assumptions so as to make the
mathematics tractable. However, making too many simplifying assumptions can make
our conclusions not applicable to the real world. Therefore, the stochastic model must
strike a balance between simplicity and realism.
Law & Kelton (1991) state that mathematic model simulation is one of the most
widely used techniques in operations research. The mathematical model is used to
represent a system in terms of logical and quantitative relationships that can be
manipulated to see how the model reacts. A stochastic process is the collection of
random variables ordered over time, which are defined on a common sample space. A
stochastic simulation model takes random variable input components and repeats the
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simulation multiple times in order to achieve a random, although converging solution.
The output of a stochastic model is itself random, but the number of repetitions can
decrease the variance in the results.
In order to create a stochastic simulation model, probability distributions and
parameters must be identified. In lieu of using the empirical distribution that may contain
some "irregularities," particularly if the sample size is small, a theoretical, parametric
distribution is used to smooth out the data (Law & Kelton, 1997). Mintz (1954a) models
taxi cab accidents in order to determine whether they could be modeled by a specific,
known distribution. In order to accomplish this simplification, Mintz makes two
assumptions: (1) accident liability (or proneness) of people is not changed by accidents in
which they are involved and do not vary over time; and (2) accident liability is distributed
in some known manner. Through his study of over 1200 taxi cab accidents, Mintz
(1954b) concludes that accident rates closely approximate a Poisson Process because (1)
they do display a "memory less" property; and (2) they are distributed as an exponential
random variable. For the purpose of the UAV mishap model, parameterized distributions
are tested to determine their suitability as model inputs.
The goal of the stochastic model is to probabilistically simulate annual Pioneer
UAV flight operations for the Navy and Marine Corps to approximate mishap events,
their cost, and effect on readiness. The model simulates these mishaps as a Poisson
Process. The model is designed with an open architecture to model any durations of
flight operations, or quantify other measures of performance (MOPs). While it may not
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be feasible or desirable to modify the Pioneer UAV with these results, they are applicable
for addressing the next generation replacement system.
In order to model intervention strategies, this model isolates causal factor
categories. Although, none of these intervention measures can be totally successful when
employed in isolation within a mishap category. For example, ACT relies on experience,
which is tied to specific UAV occupational fields and career progression within the
community. Simulators also enhance training and readiness. Aeromedical readiness is
tied to standardization and supervision. All aspects of mishap prevention are
interdependent.
Stochastic modeling is used effectively in previous studies to effectively model
accidents and their effects on cost and missed working hours. Schmorrow (1998) uses
the HFACS taxonomy to code aviation maintenance mishaps, and stochastic modeling to
predict cost and readiness. Sciretta (1999) uses a similar methodology to stochastically
model U.S. Navy shipboard electrical shock mishaps. Teeters (1999), applying HFACS,
studies the distribution of major and minor aviation maintenance mishaps for Fleet
Logistic Support (VR) Wing aircraft. This study applies a similar framework to
stochastically model UAV mishaps.
F. SUMMARY
In order to effectively analyze mishap intervention techniques, effective coding
and documentation is required. The Naval Aviation Safety program provides the
framework and resources to collect this data. HFACS is the most recent improvement to
aid in accident investigation, reporting and analysis. HFACS is based upon accepted
40
accident causation theories. Using HFACS coding, mishaps can be categorized, and
mishap probabilities determined. To analyze these categories, a stochastic model can be
used to simulate mishap occurrences over a defined period of time. While random in
themselves, the results are used to weigh the various options available to reduce mishap
cost and increase mission readiness.
Applying the HFACS taxonomy, accidents happen as a result of a confluence of
weaknesses in all four tiers of the model. Intervention strategies are designed to reinforce
the cohesion of the tiers and decrease the probability of a window of accident
opportunity. Intervention strategies are designed to strengthen safety environment at each





The goal of this research is to use a stochastic model simulation to predict the
effects of mishap intervention strategies on both operational readiness and budgetary
costs. The data inputs must be determined in order to conduct the simulation. First, a
database is constructed from the mishap reports, and causal factors are coded and parsed
from the data. Analysis of the data leads to the statistical determination of the model
inputs: inter-event times for mishaps; the mishap rate parameters; the probability of
mishaps by class (A, B or C); the mishap cost distribution; and the annual UAV flight
hours. Once calculated, these statistics are used in a stochastic model simulation of
annual UAV flight operations. The output of the model is expressed as a mission
readiness factor, and annual mishap costs. Detailed description of each phase is
discussed below.
1. Mishap Records
The Naval Safety Center (NSC) is responsible for maintaining aviation mishap
records for the Navy and Marine Corps. The foundation of the mishap record is the
mishap investigation report (MIR). MIRs are required for all Class A, B and C mishaps
in accordance with OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q. The following items are described in the
MIR: the events leading up to a mishap, the location and type of operations involved in
the mishap, causal factors and recommendations for reducing the risk of similar type
accidents occurring. Prior to FY93, UAV mishaps were not incorporated into the
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Aviation Safety Program. As a result, the MIRs are not complete and normally point only
to one causal factor, usually mechanical, electrical or human error. MIRs submitted since
October 1992 have improved mishap records significantly. Primary and contributing
factors are reported with greater detail.
2. Data Base
The database for this thesis is constructed from the UAV MIRs maintained by the
NSC, and formatted into an EXCEL spreadsheet. Each mishap event contains the
following categories: mishap date; air vehicle number; unit; mishap summary; aircraft
equipment and damage; repair cost; time, location, altitude, and weather at the mishap
occurrence; causal factors; and recommendations. All repair costs are converted into
FY98 dollars using the aviation price inflation indices provided by the Naval Center for
Cost Analysis (NCCA).
This study addresses mishap rates from the entire database (FY86-FY98). When
detailed analysis of causal factors is required, it limits its scope to the FY93-FY98 MIRs
that are standardized by the Aviation Safety Program. Additionally, this partition helps to
focus analysis on recent steady state UAV operations. Initial mishaps caused by the
introduction of the air vehicle into the Fleet inventory or by the aberrations to normal
operations such as those occurring during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm do
not confound the data.
3. Causal Factors
A single mishap typically has several codes associated with it. This analysis goes
beyond the primary causal factor, and addresses known contributing factors. Also of
44
note, mishap coding is done at the lowest level possible given the data provided. For
example, a UAI (unsafe act: intended) is a subset of UA (unsafe act). However, if the
MIR provides limited information, coding is done at the highest level discernable. The
UAV mishaps are coded by causal factor in accordance with the Human Factors Mishap
Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). Material failures are
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The computation of mishap inter-event times requires that a transformation be
made from inter-event days, as recorded by the MIR, to inter-event flight hours, for use
by the model. In order to accomplish this transformation, annual flight hours are assumed
to be uniformly distributed throughout the fiscal year. An estimate is made of daily flight
hours using annual flight hours flown information. This daily flight hour rate is
multiplied by inter-event days to transform inter-event times from days to flight hours
flown.
2. Mean, Variance, and Rate Parameters
Unbiased estimators for the mean and variance of inter-event times are determined
for each mishap category that is modeled by the simulation. The mishap rate (X) is
calculated by taking the inverse of the mean inter-event time (Ross, 1997). The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit (KS g.o.f.) test is used to decide whether an
exponential distribution with parameter (k) is an appropriate model for the inter-event
data, and thus whether the occurrence of mishaps could be modeled as a Poisson Process
(Conover, 1999). The mishap rate for the entire data set and the mishap rates by causal
factor are the components of the stochastic counting process, which is being modeled.
3. Probability ofMishap by Class
The number of mishaps by class (A, B, C) is recorded for each mishap category.
The probability of Class A, B and C mishaps is estimated by the number of mishaps in
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each class divided by the total number of mishaps in that category. A vector of Class A,
Class B and Class C probabilities is used as a multinomial input to the model simulation.
4. Cost Distribution
A cost distribution of each mishap class is determined by estimating the mean and
variance, and then performing a K-S g.o.f. test to confirm their suitability. The combined
mishap rates, probability of accident severity and cost distributions are used to describe
the model in terms of a compound Poisson Process.
5. Determining Annual Flight Hours
A regression analysis of annual flight hours by fiscal year is used to predict annual
flight hours for the stochastic model. The model uses the FY99 flight hour prediction as
the input. The time is the bound in the simulation for the mishap generation period.
C. SIMULATING THE EFFECTS OF MISHAP INTERVENTION
The mishap simulation model inputs are the number of simulation repetitions, the
mishap rate parameter, the multinomial probability vector of the mishap categories (A, B
and C), and the time period to be simulated. The program instantiates two vectors to
store the mission readiness factor, and the budgetary cost value. Each simulation run
goes from time zero to the end time period input value. Time steps are made as a mishap
is generated using the exponential distribution with the appropriate input rate parameter.
Once a mishap is encountered, its class is determined randomly, using the input
probability vector. Mishap cost is calculated using the predetermined cost distribution
data for that particular mishap class which is "hardwired" into the code.
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The simulation run ends when the time clock exceeds the input time period. The
mission readiness factor is calculated by multiplying the number of class A mishaps by
three, multiplying the number of class B mishaps by two, and adding in the number of
class C mishaps. If this readiness factor exceeds 21 for the time period, the mission
readiness is stored as a zero; otherwise, the simulation returns a one - mission ready.
Both the cost and mission readiness factor are stored in their respective vectors. Once the
simulation has completed the required number of runs, the simulation returns the mean
and standard deviation of budgetary cost (FY98$M), and the average of the readiness
factor. The mishap intervention model code, MishapSim() is programmed in S-Plus 4.0
and is attached as Appendix B.
For each mishap intervention strategy, the model is run one thousand repetitions
and through a total of four simulations. The first simulation is baseline simulation using
the current mishap rate. A reduction of the mishap rate by 10%, 30% and 50% for each
intervention strategy is hypothesized for the next three simulation runs. If two or more
mishap categories are being modeled together, for example, unsafe acts and unsafe
supervision, the rate parameters are determined as described above. However, all
replicated mishaps are removed from the composite mishap category. These calculations
will enable fleet users and program managers to weigh the effectiveness of a proposed




This chapter presents a database summary for annual flight operations by mishap
class, and flight hours flown. Mishap causal frequencies are summarized for operations
going back to 1986, and for the period of the study, 1993-98. Mishap coding results are
presented by both number and frequency. All simulation model input parameters are then
estimated and presented. Simulation results for the each mishap intervention strategy are
presented for the existing baseline and for mishap frequency reductions of 10 percent, 30
percent and 50 percent. The chapter concludes with a graphic comparison of cost and
readiness results for all intervention categories.
B. BACKGROUND UAV FLIGHT DATA
Figure 7 is a graph of flight hours flown and the number of mishaps versus time.
Table 3 contains a summary of the UAV annual flight hours, mishaps and associated rates
for the period since the fielding of the Pioneer system by the Navy and Marine Corps in
1986. In general, the annual flight hours flown is increasing and the mishap rate is
decreasing. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, six UAV units flew just
under 1000 flight hours. These units deployed with thirty air vehicles. At current mishap
rates and during a deployment of equal duration, approximately one third of the air
vehicles would be destroyed or damaged by flight mishaps. This prediction demonstrates
unacceptable mission readiness and strains maintenance and repair capabilities.
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UAV Mishap rate vs. Flight Hours
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1986 96.3 2 3 5 51.92
1987 447.1 7 2 9 20.13
1988 1,050.9 5 20 25 23.79
1989 1,310.5 9 12 21 16.02
1990 1,407.9 5 1 15 21 14.92
1991 2,156.6 12 7 10 29 13.45
1992 1,179.3 3 9 7 19 16.11
1993 1,275.6 1 5 3 9 7.06
1994 1,568.0 5 5 6 16 10.20
1995 1,391.3 1 4 11 16 11.50
1996 1,500.5 9 9 5 23 15.33
1997 2,077.0 3 2 10 15 7.22
1998 1,972.3 5 6 4 15 7.61
Total 17,433.3 67 48 108 223 12.79
Class Rate 3.84 2.75 6.20 12.79
Table 3: UAV Mishaps by Year and Classification
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C. MISHAP CODING
The frequency of mishap cause occurrences is identified in Table 4. This data is
consistent with the previous studies of Schmidt & Parker (1995) and Seagle (1997).
Appendix C contains the complete mishap-coding database. Of note, the frequency of
human factors related mishaps is not increasing. Rather, the reporting of human factors
related mishaps is increasing in detail. The Mishap Investigative Reports (MIRs)
submitted since FY 93 have increased the information available upon which to assign
causal factors. Table 5 is a summary of each category of mishap causation. The
simulation model evaluates seven mishap intervention strategies. Each intervention
strategy and its associated mishap classification category are identified in Table 6.
Mishaps Class A Class B Class C Total Percentage
FY 86-98
Overall 67 48 108 223 100%
Human Factors 15 24 48 87 39%
Electro-Mechanical 55 30 65 150 67%
FY 93-98
Overall 24 31 38 93 100%
Human Factors 11 20 24 55 59%
Electro-Mechanical 17 18 21 56 60%
Table 4: Mishap Causation Frequency
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FY 86-98 FY 93-98
CAUSAL FACTOR CODE # FREQ # FREQ
Human Factors HF 87 39.0% 55 59.1%
Unsafe Act UA 35 15.7% 35 37.6%
Intended UAI 16 7.2% 16 17.2%
Mistake UAIM 11 4.9% 11 11.8%
Violation UAIV 6 2.7% 6 6.5%
Unintended UAU 19 8.5% 19 20.4%
Slip UAUS 13 5.8% 13 14.0%
Lapse UAUL 3 1.3% 3 3.2%
Unsafe Condition UC 37 16.6% 37 39.8%
Aeromedical UCA 9 4.0% 9 9.7%
CRM UCC 26 11.7% 26 28.0%
Readiness Violation UCV 9 4.0% 9 9.7%
Unsafe Supervision US 40 17.9% 40 43.0%
Unforeseen USU 14 6.3% 14 15.1%
Foreseen USF 11 4.9% 11 11.8%
Electro - Mechanical EM 158 70.9% 64 68.8%
Engine ENG 52 23.3% 23 24.7%
Electrical ELEC 59 26.5% 20 21.5%
Launcher failure LNCHR 8 3.6% 2 2.2%
Net recovery failure NET 16 7.2% 7 7.5%
Software SOFT 7 3.1% 5 5.4%
Other OTHER 20 9.0% 8 8.6%
Unknown/ unspecified UNK 8 3.6% 7 7.5%
Table 5: Mishap Frequency by Causation Code
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Mishap Intervention Strategy Mishap Category
Aeromedical Screening and Education Unsafe Conditions (UC)
Aircrew Coordination Training / Crew
Resource Management
Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Conditions (UA/UC)
Right Simulator / TCS Unsafe Acts (UA)
Automatic Takeoff and Landing System Unsafe Acts (UA)
Personnel Stabilization Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision (UA/US)
Engine Upgrade Engine (ENG)
Weatherizing the Air vehicle Electronic (ELEC)
Table 6: Mishap Intervention Strategy and Associated Causal Category
D. STOCHASTIC MISHAP MODEL ESTIMATES
7. Inter-event Times
Figures 8 through 13 are histogram plots of the inter-arrival times for each
partition of mishap causal factors. Overlaid on the chart is a rescaled probability density
function (pdf) of the hypothesized exponential distribution. Table 7 summarizes the
mean, standard deviation and rate parameters for the mishap category parameter
estimates. Additionally, 95%, two-sided confidence intervals are presented for each rate
parameter estimate. Note that the two confidence limits are not equidistant from the point
estimate. This is due to the lack of symmetry in the exponential distribution. The
Kolomogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit (KS g.o.f.) test for the exponential distribution is
based on the estimated rate parameter. With a significance level (a) set at 0.05, the KS
g.o.f. test fails to reject that any of the distributions are exponential.
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Figure 9: Histogram PlotofUA/UC Data
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Figure 10: Histogram Plot of UA Data
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UC 37 238.6 216.2 4.19 2.95 5.65 0.665
UA/UC 47 195.3 189.8 5.12 3.76 6.68 0.406
UA 35 262.3 212.7 3.81 2.66 5.18 0.160
UA/US 52 176.5 156.9 5.67 4.23 7.31 0.484
ENG 23 406.9 479.5 2.46 1.56 3.56 0.478
ELEC 20 467.6 453.8 2.14 1.31 3.17 0.409
Table 7: Parameter Estimates for Mean, Standard Deviation and Rate
2. Mishap Class Probability Parameters
Table 8 is a summary of the calculations used to estimate the probability of each
type of mishap (pA , Pb, Pc)- Of note, the estimated probability of each class of mishap
(PA-Hat, PB-Hat, Pc-Hat) varies with the mishap category. For example, an engine failure is
most likely to cause a catastrophic class A mishap, while the results of an unsafe act can
be mitigated by other actions of the crew.
Class A Class B Class C
Code n # mishaps PA-Hat # mishaps PB-Hat # mishaps PC-Hat
UC 37 6 0.162 16 0.432 15 0.405
UA/UC 47 8 0.170 19 0.404 20 0.426
UA 35 5 0.143 15 0.429 15 0.429
UA/US 52 10 0.192 20 0.385 22 0.423
ENG 23 9 0.391 4 0.174 10 0.435
ELEC 20 4 0.200 10 0.500 6 0.300
Table 8: Mishap Class Probabilities
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3. Cost Parameters
Table 9 summarizes the parametric estimates for the mishap cost distributions.
Each is hypothesized to be normally distributed. All cost figures are calculated as FY98
dollars. Figures 14 through 16 are normal probability plots of the actual data versus the
hypothesized distributions. Graphically, there are some discrepancies between the sample
data and the hypothesized distribution. However, the KS g.o.f. tests the hypothesized
distribution using the parameter estimates listed in Table 9. With a significance level (a)
set at 0.05, the KS g.o.f. test fails to reject the normality of any of the cost distributions.
Estimates Distribution KS g.o.f.
Mean Std Dev $FY98 p-value
Class A $811,504 $189,306 N(812K, 187K) 0.4802
Class B $479,933 $214,503 N(480K,214K) 0.6073
Class C $87,649 $64,065 N(88K, 64K) 0.1928
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Figure 15: Normal Probability Plot of Class B Mishap Costs
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Figure 16: Normal Probability Plot of Class C Mishap Costs
4. Annual Flight Hours
A linear regression of annual flight hours versus the natural log of fiscal year is
performed on historic flight hours flown. The equation-projected estimate of flight hours
for the next fiscal year (FY99) is 1.930 flight hours. This will be used as the number of
annual flight hours in the simulation. Figure 17 contains a graph of the historic flight
hours and the fitted equation, adjusted to time on a linear scale.
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y = 651.77ln(x) + 210.34
x - FY87 thru FY98
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Figure 17: Results of Annual Flight Hour Regression
E. STOCHASTIC MODEL SIMULATION
/. Model: Baseline of total mishaps
The aggregate mishap model is presented in Table 10. It is used as a baseline for
comparison of the remaining models. Calculating the defined readiness factor, this model
indicates that UAVs never achieve a mission ready condition. Also, UAV mishap costs
typically exceed $10 million. The following model simulations are used to gain insight
into the cost and mission readiness improvements over current baseline conditions made
by targeting mishap causes with the specified strategies.
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Category: TOTAL Baseline X - 10% X - 30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 12.79 11.51 8.95 6.4
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $10.91 $9.70 $7.54 $5.63
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $2.83 $2.62 $2.30 $1.92
% change in Cost -11.2% -30.9% -48.4%
Readiness Index 0.0000 0.0020 0.0640 0.3000
% change in Readiness N/A N/A N/A
Table 10: Aggregate Mishap Model
2. Model: Increased Aeromedical Screening and Education
Table 1 1 summarizes the unsafe conditions mishap intervention model. Even at
current levels, the readiness indicator for unsafe conditions does not go below 80%. This
is most likely the result of the relative probability of a class A mishaps being low
compared to the aggregate model. As a result, costs are also kept low, accounting for
approximately 1/3 of the aggregate mishap costs.
Category: UC Baseline X - 10% a. -30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 4.20 3.78 2.95 2.10
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $3.51 $3.09 $2.60 $1.94
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.44 $1.36 $1.21 $1.03
% change in Cost -12.1% -26.1% -44.8%
Readiness Index 0.8400 0.9170 0.9710 0.9970
% change in Readiness 9.2% 15.6% 18.7%
Table 1 1 : Unsafe Conditions Model
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3. Model: Aircrew Coordination Training / Crew Resource Management
Table 1 2 summarizes the mishap intervention model for the aggregate of unsafe
acts and unsafe conditions. ACT / CRM will have to reduce the mishap rate by over 10%
in order to get readiness above the 80% level. Additionally, at $4 million per year in
mishap cost contributions, unsafe acts and unsafe conditions combined contribute to
approximately one-third of mishap costs.
Category: UA/UC Baseline X - 10% X - 30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 5.11 4.60 3.58 2.56
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $4.01 $3.63 $2.93 $2.16
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.56 $1.40 $1.29 $1.10
% change in Cost -9.5% -26.8% -46.0%
Readiness Index 0.7040 0.8010 0.9350 0.9910
% change in Readiness 13.8% 32.8% 40.8%
Table 12: Aggregate Unsafe Acts / Unsafe Conditions Model
4. Model: UAV Flight Simulator /Automated Take offand Landing
System
Table 13 summarizes the mishap intervention model for unsafe acts. This model
is used to evaluate the potential results of both the flight simulator and of the take off and
landing aids. While the category of unsafe acts contributes to 37% percent of mishaps,
their effect on readiness is not as profound. Even in the baseline case, unsafe acts have a
ready index of nearly 90 percent. Because of their nature, unsafe acts will contribute to
mishap occurrences, but their individual effects do not have as great an impact on overall
changes in readiness and costs.
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Category: UA Baseline X - 10% ?i-30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 3.82 3.44 2.67 1.91
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $3.16 $2.94 $2.29 $1.74
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.40 $1.29 $1.11 $0.95
% change in Cost -6.9% -27.6% -44.8%
Readiness Index 0.8970 0.9430 0.9860 1.0000
% change in Readiness 5.1% 9.9% 11.5%
Table 13: Unsafe Acts Model
5. Model: Personnel Stabilization
Table 14 summarizes the mishap intervention model for the aggregate of unsafe
acts and unsafe supervision. This is the only model that incorporates the effects of unsafe
supervision. Although difficult to isolate, unsafe supervision when coupled with unsafe
acts does have a profound effect on both cost and readiness. The model bears out that
personnel stability has the potential to significantly improved readiness and reduced cost.
Category: UA/US Baseline X - 10% X - 30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 5.66 5.09 3.96 2.83
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $4.52 $4.20 $3.39 $2.52
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.76 $1.60 $1.44 $1.21
% change in Cost -7.2% -25.2% -44.4%
Readiness Index 0.5570 0.6760 0.8710 0.9750
% change in Readiness 21.4% 56.4% 75.0%
Table 14: Aggregate Act/Unsafe Supervision Model
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6. Model: Engine Replacement
Table 15 summarizes the mishap intervention model for engine failure related
events. Engine failure accounts for nearly 25 percent of mishaps. Intuitively,
modifications to the engine should cause a significant cost reduction and readiness
improvement. However, the model results indicate that the effect on mission readiness is
negligible since the baseline readiness factor already exceeds 95 percent. Additionally,
the budgetary cost of these mishaps is less than or equal to other mishap categories.
Category: ENG Baseline X - 10% X - 30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 2.46 2.21 1.72 1.23
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $2.64 $2.44 $1.90 $1.49
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.29 $1.28 $1.15 $0.92
% change in Cost -7.6% -28.0% -43.6%
Readiness Index 0.9750 0.9780 0.9990 1.0000
% change in Readiness 0.3% 2.5% 2.6%
Table 15: Engine Model
7. Model: Electronic Waterproofing
Table 16 summarizes the mishap intervention model for the improvements to
electronic component reliability. Electronic component failure is cited in over 20% of
UAV mishaps, but similar to engine failure, its impact on readiness and annual costs is
overshadowed by the other causal categories. The model indicates that the effect of
electrical failures upon mission readiness is minimal.
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Category: ELEC Baseline ?i-10% X - 30% X - 50%
Mishap Rate / 1000 flight hours 2.14 1.93 1.50 1.07
Mean Cost (CY98 $M) $2.20 $2.06 $1.70 $1.34
SD Cost (CY98 $M) $1.07 $1.01 $0.91 $0.83
% change in Cost -6.6% -23.0% -39.2%
Readiness Index 0.9980 0.9980 1.0000 1.0000
% change in Readiness 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Table 16: Electronic Model
F. MODEL COMPARISON
Figures 18 and 19 are a comparison between the results of the mishap intervention
simulations. Figure 18 compares the cost reduction in each category for the four runs of
the model. Clearly, there is improvement across all strategies, but improvements in
UA/UC and UA/US appear to cause more significant cost savings. Figure 19 illustrates
the mission readiness index improvement. Inspection of the graph reveals that addressing
the UC, UA/UC and UA/US categories will have the greatest impact on mission
readiness. According to the simulation, none of other causal factors reduces the readiness
factor below 80 percent.
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Figure 19: Mishap Readiness Index Improvement
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. MISHAP CLASSIFICATION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mishaps are successfully categorized by the
Human Factors Accident and Classification System (HFACS) using the Naval Aviation
Safety Program (OPNAVINST 3750.6Q) mishap report procedures. However,
granularity at the lowest tiers of the HFACS model can be difficult to ascertain. The
information available for analysis appears to vary with the writer of the report. If that
individual is aware and comfortable with HFACS, the report tends to address all of the
details required for future analysis. Otherwise, reports contain generalities and lack the
specific details necessary to conduct an in depth analysis of the data. The planned
incorporation of the HFACS taxonomy into the next revision of OPNAVINST 3750.6R,
should standardize reporting procedures, and educate those preparing mishap reports on
the scope that human factors can have on flight operations.
This analysis of mishap classification is conducted independently of the data
partition of Schmidt & Parker (1995) and Seagle (1997). The three separate mishap
categorizations are similar in terms of the relative frequency and causes of mishaps.
Individual judgments were required by those conducting the study in order to place a
particular mishap into a causation category. While not always agreeing in the exact
classification, the three studies do conclude that human error is at least partially
attributable for approximately one half of UAV mishaps. Engine and electronic failure
each account for 20 to 25 percent of mishaps. Finally, although the mishap rate is
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decreasing, current mishap damage and losses will continue to have a profound affect on
mission readiness.
B. MISHAP MODELING
The mishap occurrence distribution is modeled effectively as a Poisson process.
Cost data and mishap class data distributions can also be modeled by specific
distributions. These distributional quantities are effectively input into the stochastic
model, allowing the analyst to simulate annual UAV flight operations accurately.
C. MODEL RESULTS
The aggregate UAV mishap rate must be reduced by one half in order to achieve a
significant change in total mishap occurrences. This mishap reduction still only raises the
readiness index to 0.300. (See Figure 19.) In order to focus the mishap intervention
strategies, they must be analyzed in isolation. Under the current baseline rates two
mishap categories, Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions (UA/UC), and Unsafe Acts and
Unsafe Supervision (UA/US), cause the readiness index to fall below 0.800. The
simulations demonstrate that improvements up to 40.8 percent and 75.0 percent,
respectively, can be achieved in these categories. This indicates that they should be
considered primary targets for intervention strategies.
The other impact of the simulated UAV mishaps is cost. Again, the UA/UC and
UA/US categories are the two most costly mishap causal factors. Each contributes
greater than $4 million (FY98$) to annual mishap costs in the model. Intervention in
these categories can reduce costs by 44.4 percent and 40.8 percent, respectively.
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Although not considered in this model, intervention strategies should be compared to find
the best value for the money invested.
Contrary to expectations, incorporating engineering modifications, (engine
improvement/replacement, and electronic waterproofing) will have marginal effects on
readiness and cost. At current mishap rates, the engine and electronic configuration do
not degrade mission readiness below 95 percent. Additionally, their mishap costs are
approximately the same as the other mishap categories. The cost involved in research,
development and procurement will most likely exceed current mishap cost predictions
and can be better spent improving other aspects of the Pioneer system.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The evaluation of the stochastic model results points to mishap intervention
measures for the UA/UC and UA/US categories. This research proposes improvements
to aircrew coordination training and crew resource management in order to alleviate the
effects of the UA/UC category. Initiatives in this area will not only improve Pioneer
UAV operations, but will have a listing impact on the UAV community, regardless of the
system employed. When the Pioneer is eventually replaced, only minor modifications
should be necessary to adjust to the idiosyncrasies of the new systems. The second area
of intervention recommended is UAV personnel stabilization. The UAV community is
still relatively new to Naval Aviation operations. As such, the community needs to
mature. Unit leaders, both officer and enlisted, should have experience and knowledge of
the system in order to effectively manage unit operations and individual crewmembers. A
UAV career path should be created to track these individuals and assign them
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appropriately throughout their careers so that the UAV community can benefit from the
stability and "corporate knowledge" enjoyed by other Naval flight communities.
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APPENDIX A: PIONEER UAV SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. SYSTEM COMPONENTS
A Pioneer UAV system consists of five Pioneer air vehicles, a ground control
station (GCS), a portable control station (PCS), a tracking communications unit (TCU), a
data link, two remote receiver stations (RRS) and a reconnaissance payload. The system
can be operated aboard specially configured USS Austin Class Landing Platform Dock
(LPD-4) ships or from prepared airstrips ashore.
1. The Air Vehicle
FIGURE 20: PIONEER AIR VEHICLE
The Pioneer vehicle air is 14 feet long and is pusher-propeller driven, powered by
a 26 hp, two stroke, twin cylinder, rear mounted engine, similar to a snowmobile engine.
The air vehicle is made of fiberglass, Kevlar and other low cost composite materials, and
weighs 463 lbs. The air vehicle can operate up to an altitude of 15,000 feet, but normally
flies between 3000 and 5000 feet in order to optimize payload performance. Because the
air vehicle uses a laminated wood propeller, and the electronic components are not
weatherized, the UAV cannot fly through visible moisture (fog, clouds, rain, etc.) or icing
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conditions. The air vehicle has up to four-hour time of flight at a cruise speed of 65
knots, which normally translates into 2-2.5 hours in an objective area depending on the
proximity of the airstrip to the objective.
The air vehicle is launched using one of three methods. The rocket-assisted take
off (RATO) is the only method available for shipboard operations. A rocket is placed
under the vehicle to propel it into the air. Having reached sufficient altitude and airspeed,
the rocket motor shuts down and is jettisoned from the UAV. Land-based units can also
conduct RATO launch. Additionally on land, the UAV can use a standard rolling take of
from a 1500-foot runway. Because of restrictive crosswind parameters, or air density
constraints, a rolling takeoff may not be possible. For these instances, a pneumatic
launcher mounted on a 5-ton truck can propel the vehicle to the minimum altitude and
airspeed to transition to vehicle-powered flight.







FlGURE 22: PNEUMATIC LAUNCHER TAKEOFF
There are two ways to safely recover the air vehicle. Operations at sea require the
UAV to be flown into a large net suspended across the aft part of a ship's helicopter flight
deck. Once, in the net, the recovery system collapses around the UAV allowing it to be
lifted out. Because this recovery method is tantamount to a controlled crash, there is
frequent damage to the UAV. The second recovery method, used ashore, is an arrested
recovery by a miniature tailhook on an airstrip. While much more suitable for a crash
free recovery, cross wind limitation must be monitored in order to assure a successful
recovery (MAWTS-1, 1997).
Figure 23: UAV Shipboard Landing
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2. The Ground Control Station (GCS)
The GCS is the focus of activity for UAV missions. The system can either be
land based or installed aboard ship. The GCS consists of three electronics bays manned
by two operators. The pilot bay includes all controls, instruments and displays required to
safely "fly" the vehicle. The observer bay provides control and display of the imaging
payloads carried by the UAV. The tracking bay displays the UAV position based on data
from the TCU and global positioning satellites (GPS) (Pioneer UAV, INC., 1999).
FIGURE 24: INSIDE THE GCS
3. The Portable Control Station (PCS)
The PCS provides the capability to control the UAV during pre-flight. launch and
recovery operations, allowing the GCS to locate where it can most effectively conduct the
mission. Because the air vehicle relies on line of site communications between the
control station and the air vehicle, split sight operations arc common in rugged.
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compartmented terrain. The PCS provides the ability to control the launch sequence from
a local airstrip, and then steer the air vehicle to a predetermined handover point. There,
the GCS. operating from a more advantageous location, can take control of the UAV and
conduct the mission further down ranse (MAWTS-1, 1997).
Figure 25: Inside the PCS Control Bay
4. The Tracking Control Unit (TCU)
The TCU shelter contains the UAV communication equipment and antennas. The
TCU contains a sophisticated, jam resistant, C-band, 100 nmi. range data link. Both the
video and telemetry link use directional antennas between the air vehicle and the TCU in
order to ensure video quality and minimize the probability of data link intercept by the
enemy. The system also has an omni-directional, UHF backup link for redundancy. The
TCU can be remoted 1000 meters from the GCS by fiber-optic cable, enhancing the
system's and personnel battlefield survivability (Pioneer UAV, INC., 1999).
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FIGURE 26: THE TCU
5. Remote Receiving Station (RRS)
The ruggedized RRS provides real-time reception of the UAV video picture at
remote locations. The Marine Corps has mounted the RRS on a high mobility multi-
wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), a light armored vehicle (LAV) and aboard a UH-1N Huey
helicopter, allowing the tactical commander to have real-time imagery regardless of
where the command post is locating (MAWTS-1, 1997).
Figure 27: The RRS
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6. Reconnaissance Payloads
The air vehicle can carry one of two separate, gyrostabilized payloads: the MKD-
200 electro-optical day camera, and the MKD-400(C) forward-looking infrared (FLIR)
night camera. The MKD-200 E-O camera can detect targets up to 18 km range, and
recognizes targets at 3 km range. The MKD-400(C) FLIR camera can detect a target at 8
km range, and recognizes a target at up to 4 km. Camera performance is enhanced by
increased thermal differential between the target and the surrounding background
(MAWTS-1, 1997).
Figure 28: UAV Payloads
B. CREW COMPOSITION
The term "unmanned" is actually a misnomer when applied to the Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle system because UAV operations involve many participants. The essential
members of a UAV crew include a Mission Commander, an Internal Pilot, a Payload
Operator and an External Pilot. Additionally launch and recovery teams and maintenance
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personnel will be involved in flight operations. The responsibilities of each crewmember
are summarized below (JUAVTOPS, 1997):
1. Mission Commander (MC)
The MC is typically a rated Naval Aviator or Naval Flight Officer, who has the
supervisory responsibility for the UAV mission. This includes organizing the entire flight
crew, coordination with external agencies and supported units during pre-mission
planning, execution, and post mission debriefing.
2. Internal Pilot (IP)
Typically a senior enlisted aviation rating, who flies the UAV down range,
monitors instruments to ensure proper operation, and assists the payload operator (PO) to
get optimal camera position. The IP is also responsible for in-flight emergencies.
3. Payload Operator (PO)
The PO is an enlisted operator who controls the UAV camera and monitors the
tracker bay to insure proper orientation. The PO assists the IP through visual navigation
and during in-flight emergencies.
4. External Pilot (EP)
The EP, typically an enlisted operator, flies the UAV during launch and recovery
operations. He coordinates the UAV handoff to the IP, and handles all launch and
recovery emergencies.
5. Other Crewmembers
Depending on the complexity of the mission, and the experience of the crew,
additional personnel may be required to augment the basic crew. Intelligence personnel
may be involved to exploit the video imagery and pass that information on to the
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appropriate supported units. If the mission calls for fire support adjustment, an artillery
or naval gunfire forward observer will be added to the crew. The crew is then rounded
out with UAV maintenance and communications personnel.
81
82
APPENDIX B: MISHAP SIMULATION CODE
MishapSim(
)




# runs is the number of repetitions for the simulation
# lamda is the inter-arrival mishap rate for an exponential
# distribution.
# PHat is a vector of probabilities for a class A, B or C
# mishap as calculated by the ClassSim( ) function.




# This simulation is based on an annual flight hour period.
# A random exponential variable with the inputted rate
# parameter is used to simulate the occurrence of a mishap.
# This is used to increment the time.
#
# Once a mishap is generated, a second random sample is
# drawn to determine the type of mishap (class A, B or C)
.
# The damage cost is also determined by the cost
# distribution data that is hardwired into the program.
#
# A cost vector and readiness index vector are built as
# each annual flight period is completed. The weighted
# readiness index weighs a class A = 3, class B = 2, class
# C =1. The maximum index in order to be "MISSION READY"







# The Function returns a vector of simulated annual costs,
# the mean and standard deviation of the mishap cost and
# the average readiness index for the year.
#####
readiness <- vector (" integer
"
, runs)
totalCost <- vector ( "double" , runs)
for ( i in 1 : runs ) {
time <-





while (time < fltHours) {
time <- time + rexp ( 1 , lamda/1000)
mishapType <- sample (mishapClass , 1, replace
= T, PHat)
if (mishapType == "A") {
damage <- rnormd, 812000, 187000)
numA <- numA + 1
}
if (mishapType == "B" ) {
damage <- max(200000, rnormd, 480000,
214000)
)
numB <- numB + 1
}
if (mishapType == "C") {
damage <- max (10000, rnormd, 88000,
64000)
)
numC <- numC + 1
}




readiness [i] <- 1
readyFactor <- 3 * numA + 2 * numB + numC




mishapCost <- mean ( totalCost
)
SDCost <- sqrt (var (totalCost)
)
readylndex <- mean (readiness
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